

THE FIRST MARYLAND CAMPAIGN.

AN ADDRESS

— BY —

Brig.-Gen'l Bradley T. Johnson,

DELIVERED FEBRUARY 22, 1886,

— AT THE —

FOURTH ANNUAL RE-UNION

— OF THE —

ASSOCIATION OF THE MARYLAND LINE,

— AT —

ORATORIO HALL, BALTIMORE, MD.

PRINTED BY ORDER OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE MARYLAND LINE.

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N O T E .

This address was originally delivered in Richmond before the Association of the Army of Northern Virginia and was printed by the Association and published in the Southern Historical Society Papers.

Since then I have had the advantage of criticisms from ex-President Davis, Generals Early, D. H. Hill, E. P. Alexander, Fitz Lee, Wade Hampton and M. C. Butler, Colonels A. P. Mason, Thos. H. Carter and H. Kyd Douglas and other officers, as well as of fuller information, and I have corrected it accordingly.

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THE FIRST MARYLAND CAMPAIGN.

Some one has said that the South fought the War of Secession upon the sentimentalities of the Waverly Novels and the Romances of the Cavaliers. Without stopping to analyze that observation, I will say that there was a significant connection by heredity and blood between the actors of the War of the Revolution, and those of the war between the States.

Many descendants of leaders of the Revolution in the Northern States sympathized with the South—some of them actually bore arms for the Confederacy. In Maryland not a single historic family that I can recall but was represented in our army by almost all of its arms-bearing youth.

Howard, Carroll, Tilghman, Goldsborough, Holliday, Johnson, Stone, Chase, Dent, Bowie, were all there in force.

The Colonel, commanding the Maryland Line, in the Army of Northern Virginia, mustered to his flag twenty-nine kinsmen.

The same faith in honor, the same devotion to liberty, that actuated the sires under Smallwood at Long Island, under Williams at Eutaw, and under Howard at Cowpens, inspired their descendants in the Valley campaign, at First and Second Coal Harbor, and at Gettysburg.

Therefore, proud of our efforts to maintain the principles for which our ancestors fought, after the war was over, we have formed this Association to perpetuate our comradeship, to assist our destitute and to aid in transmitting the truth to history.

We can now confidently leave to time and to truth, the vindication of our motives, the defence of our political action, and the description of the genius, the courage and the achievements of the Confederate soldier.

Brief, but glorious, was that epoch that blazed out in the history of all time, but no four years have ever produced such results or made such impression on the art of war.

The Confederate war-ship, Virginia (Merrimac), made a complete revolution in naval architecture and warfare.

The Confederate torpedo service has made an entire change in the system of defence of water-ways.

The Confederate Cavalry raid has necessitated an alteration in the tactics, as well as the strategy of armies and Generals.

Von Borcke told me that while Stuart's raid around McClellan was not regarded with respect by the Prussian Generals in the Prusso-Austrian campaign of 1866, the principle of thus using Cavalry was adopted in full by them, in the Franco-Prussian campaign of 1870, and that now Stuart was considered the first Cavalry General of the century, as the campaigns of Lee and Jackson were the examples taught from, in Continental Military Schools.

While the civil war afforded many brilliant illustrations of genius for war, of daring and heroic achievement, while the Valley campaign furnishes a model and the defence of Richmond, in 1864, an exhibition of defensive operations, alike the wonder and the admiration of soldiers all over the world, the fourteen days occupied by the First Maryland campaign were probably more remarkable for their performances, and their results, than any other episode of the war.

Taking into consideration the time occupied, the distances marched, the results achieved and the incredible disparity of numbers between the armies engaged, the operations of that campaign were as extraordinary as any ever recorded for the same period of time.

On the first day of January, 1862, the President of the United States issued a general order, somewhat sensational and dramatic, to all of the armies of the United States, directing them to make a general advance on the 22d of February, then ensuing, on the whole line extending from Washington city to the Missouri river. The forces intended for the reduction of Virginia were the Army of Western Virginia, General Fremont; the Army of the Shenandoah, General Banks; the Army of the Potomac, General McClellan; and the Army of North Carolina, General Burnside. After this general movement had been made, a fifth army was organized as the Army of Virginia, which was to co-operate with these converging columns in the general movement on the Capital of the Confederate States. Burnside's army occupied Roanoke Island and New Berne and seated itself on the flank of Richmond. Banks had been driven across the Potomac on May 25th. Fremont moved up the Valley as far as Cross

Keys, where he met his checkmate from Jackson on the 9th of June. McClellan advanced up the Peninsula as far as Mechanicsville, three and a-half miles from Richmond, and after seven days' hard fighting, June 26th to July 1st, succeeded in changing his base to Harrison's Landing, on the James, thirty miles from Richmond—a hazardous and meritorious undertaking, when nothing better could be done; and Major-General John Pope had been first checked by Jackson at Cedar Run, August 9th, and then, with the consolidated armies of Burnside, Fremont, McClellan and his own, had been escorted back to the fortifications on the south bank of the Potomac, from which McClellan had moved with such confidence and high expectation in obedience to President Lincoln's general order in the preceding spring. On the 2d of September General McClellan was directed verbally by Mr. Lincoln to assume command of the demoralized mass of troops which had just been beaten under Pope at Manassas.

His order to General Pope on that occasion epitomizes more graphically than I can the results of the six months' campaign of five armies to reduce Virginia. His order was in these words:

“HEADQUARTERS, Washington, Sept. 2d, 1862.

“GENERAL—General Halleck instructed me to report to you the order he sent this morning, to withdraw your army to Washington without unnecessary delay. He feared that his messenger might miss you and desired to take this double precaution.

“In order to bring troops upon ground with which they are already familiar, it would be best to move Porter's Corps upon Upton's Hill, that it may occupy Hall's Hill, &c.; McDowell's to Upton's Hill; Franklin's to the works in front of Alexandria; Heintzelman's to the same vicinity; Couch to Fort Corcoran, or, if practicable, to the Chain Bridge; Sumner either to Fort Albany or to Alexandria, as the case may be most convenient.”

In haste, General, very truly yours,

GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN,

Major-General United States Army.

Major-General John Pope,

Commanding Army of Virginia.

The old lines of Upton's, Hall's and Munson's Hills, with the peach orchards and the gardens, that we fought over and occupied

in September, 1861, were to be re-taken and re-occupied by the five armies seeking refuge from Lee's pursuit in September, 1862.

The number of troops who thus sheltered themselves by McClellan's command, behind the fortifications of Washington was 160,000. There were besides, in the Lower Valley, at Winchester, Martinsburg and Harpers Ferry, over 11,000 more. General Lee had with him probably about 40,000 men of all arms present for duty.

Under these circumstances, it was impossible to stay where he was, re-occupy the old Centreville lines, and wait until his adversary had refreshed and reorganized the immense force at his disposal. That would have been increased by the concentration of seasoned troops from the West and volunteers from the whole North. A sufficient force could then have held the Confederate Army in Northern Virginia, while an overpowering column would have taken Richmond on the flank from York River or the James. The same objection would apply to an occupation of the line of the Rappahannock, with the additional serious objection, that the fertile counties along the Potomac and in the Lower Valley would be thereby abandoned to the Federal occupation.

Therefore, there was only one practicable movement to make and that was, to cross the Potomac, relieve Virginia from the war for the present, and at least delay further aggressive operations on the part of the Federal Generals, until the season itself should interpose an insuperable barrier to further advance for that year.

I believe that I know that the Maryland campaign was not undertaken by General Lee under any delusive hope that his presence there would produce a revolution in Maryland, and such a rising as would give a large force of reinforcements to him.

During the march of the 4th of September, General Jackson required me to give him a detailed description of the country in Maryland on the other side of the Potomac, of which I was a native, and with the topography, resources, and political condition of which I was familiar. I impressed upon him emphatically the fact that a large portion of the people were ardent Unionists; that perhaps an equal number were equally ardent sympathizers with the Confederate cause; still, they had been since June, 1861, so crushed beneath the overwhelming military force, that they could not be expected to afford us material aid until we gave them assurance of an opportunity for relief, by an occupation promising at least some permanence. That night General Jackson invited me to accompany him to General Lee's

headquarters in Leesburg, and there requested me to repeat our conversation of the day to the latter. I did so at length.

General Lee particularly required information as to the topography of the banks of the Potomac between Loudoun county, Virginia, and Frederick county, Maryland, and those about Harper's Ferry and Williamsport. After several hours the conversation ceased.

Jackson sat bolt upright asleep.

Lee sat straight, solemn, and stern, and at last said, as if in soliloquy: "When I left Richmond, I told the President that I would, if possible, relieve Virginia of the pressure of these two armies. If I cross *here*, I may do so at the cost of men, but with a saving of time. If I cross at Williamsport, I can do so with a saving of men, but at cost of time. I wish Walker were up," or words expressing a desire or anxiety about Walker. This incident I relate to prove what, in my judgment, was the real objective of General Lee in the Maryland campaign. It was not as the Count of Paris states in his history of the civil war, or as General Palfrey, in his well-considered and elaborate memoir of Antietam says, that by the transfer of the seat of war to the north banks of the Potomac the secessionists of Maryland would be afforded an opportunity to rise, and by revolution, supported by Lee's army, transfer Maryland to the Confederation of States.

General Lee knew perfectly well that a people who had been under military rule for fifteen months, who had been subjugated by every method known to military and relentless force, could not organize resistance or revolution until confidence in themselves and their cause had been restored by the presence of an abiding and permanent power. Therefore, it seems beyond dispute that the First Maryland campaign was undertaken by General Lee solely and entirely as part of his defensive operation for the protection of Virginia. It was an offensive-defensive operation, having as its objective neither the invasion of Pennsylvania nor the redemption of Maryland, but only the relief of the Confederacy as far as the means at his command would permit. The reason for and object of the Maryland campaign cannot be better stated than was done by General Lee himself in his report: "The armies of Generals McClellan and Pope," says he, "had now been brought back to the point from which they set out on the campaigns of the spring and summer. The objects of their campaigns had been frustrated, and the designs of the enemy on the coast of North Carolina, and in Western Virginia, thwarted by

the withdrawal of the main body of his forces from those regions. Northeastern Virginia was freed from the presence of Federal soldiers up to the entrenchments of Washington, and soon after the arrival of the army at Leesburg information was received that the troops which had occupied Winchester had retired to Harper's Ferry and Martinsburg. The war was thus transferred from the interior to the frontier, and the supplies of rich and productive districts made accessible to our army. To prolong a state of affairs in every way desirable and not to permit the season for active operations to pass without endeavoring to inflict further injury upon the enemy, the best course appeared to be the transfer of the army into Maryland. Although not properly equipped for invasion, lacking much of the material of war, and feeble in transportation, the troops poorly provided with clothing and thousands of them destitute of shoes, it was yet believed to be strong enough to detain the enemy upon the Northern frontier until the approach of winter should render his advance into Virginia difficult, if not impracticable. The condition of Maryland encouraged the belief that the presence of our army, however inferior to that of the enemy, would induce the Washington government to retain all its available force to provide against contingencies, which its course toward the people of that State, gave it reason to apprehend.

"At the same time it was hoped that military success might afford an opportunity to aid the citizens of Maryland in any efforts they might feel disposed to make to recover their liberties. The difficulties that surrounded them were fully appreciated, and we expected to derive more assistance in the attainment of our object from the just fears of the Washington government than from active demonstration on the part of the people unless success should enable us to give them assurance of continued protection.

"Influenced by these considerations, the army was put in motion, and crossed the Potomac east of the Blue Ridge, in order that by threatening Washington and Baltimore the enemy would be forced to withdraw from the south bank of the Potomac, and thus the wounded, and the captured property on the field of Manassas be relieved from threatened attack. And afterward, this result accomplished, it was proposed to move the army into Western Maryland, establish our communication with Richmond through the Valley of the Shenandoah, and, by threatening Pennsylvania, induce the enemy to follow and thus draw him from his base of supplies."

General Lee's purpose, then, in transferring the seat of war to the north of the Potomac was, first—to relieve Virginia from the pressure of the contending armies and delay another invasion until the next season.

Second—To inflict as great an injury, material and moral, on his enemy as was practicable.

Third—To reinforce the Confederacy by the alliance of Maryland, which could have been certainly secured by a permanent occupation and by an exhibition of superior force. And

Fourth—As a consequence, the occupation of the Federal Capital, the evacuation of it by the Federal government, the acknowledgment of the Confederate government as a government *de jure* as well as *de facto* by France and England, and the necessary achievement of the independence of the Confederate States.

During the summer of 1862, the Emperor of the French had been openly in sympathy with the cause of the Confederate States, and under the name of sometimes "mediation," sometimes "recognition," had always been anxious to intervene in their behalf. He was pressing the English government, without ceasing, to unite with him in acknowledging the existence of the new government, and recognition, as all the world knew at that time, meant independence. Therefore, when Lee crossed the Potomac, he was playing for a great stake. He had the certainty of relieving his own country from the burden of the war and of beating back invasion until the next year; and he had the possibility of ending the war and achieving the independence of his people by one short and brilliant stroke of genius, endurance and courage. How he accomplished the first and why he failed in the last it shall be my endeavor to make plain in this narrative.

The victory at Manassas had left Lee with about 40,000 men. He had cooped up in the entrenchments of Washington about 160,000 men. The army which he led was composed of the veterans of Jackson's Foot Cavalry, of Hill's Light Division and of Longstreet's First Corps, seasoned by the marches and tempered by the victories in the Valley, in the seven days' battles at Cedar Mountain and at Second Manassas over Banks, Fremont, Shields, McClellan and Pope. Jackson's men had been marching and fighting from May 23d to September 1st. The two—Hill's and Longstreet's—from June 25th to the same date. The troops who were left after these campaigns were as hard and tough as troops ever have been, for the process of elimination had dropped out all the inferior materials.

Jackson left the Waterloo Bridge, on the Rappahannock, on the 25th of August, and no rations were issued to his people until they camped about Frederick on the 6th of September, twelve days afterwards. They had marched and had fought Second Manassas and Chantilly during that time, subsisting on green corn or such supplies as the men, individually, could pick up on the roadside, except some rations captured at Manassas. The rest of the army was no better off. Therefore, when Lee undertook the forward movement over the Potomac, numbers of brave men fell out of ranks, barefooted and utterly broken down from want of proper food.

While the army was in Virginia they struggled along as best they could, and a few days' halt for rest or battle enabled them to catch up and rejoin their colors. As soon as the Potomac was crossed they were cut off and prevented from re-occupying their positions in ranks until the army returned to Virginia. Thus it was that the army which followed Lee into Maryland was so reduced that the statements as to its numerical strength have ever since furnished ground for incredulous criticism by Northern writers. It is a fact, however, that when the Army of Northern Virginia crossed the Potomac on the fourth and fifth days of September, 1862, not more than 35,000 men were present for duty. There were then in and about Washington 160,000, as McClellan's report shows.

The first days of September were laden with anxious forebodings to the leaders of the Union side.

The Army of the Potomac had been driven to shelter behind the entrenchments it had constructed in 1861, to protect the Capital from the victorious troops of Johnston and Beauregard. The Army of Virginia, demoralized and disorganized, had sought the protection of the same works.

The armies of Fremont and of Burnside had ceased to exist, and had been absorbed in the rout of the Armies of the Potomac and of Virginia. The President of the United States, distracted by grave cares, seems to have been the only one who preserved his faculties and exercised his judgment. His advisers, Stanton and Halleck, dominated by jealousy and hatred of McClellan, had united to destroy him, and during the second battle of Manassas had left him at Alexandria without hearing of Lee's guns, his troops ordered to Pope and himself without even the troop of Cavalry, his customary escort.

Lee disappeared from the front of Washington on the 3d of September. That he had fallen back into Virginia was incredible; that

he was marching up the south bank of the Potomac was entirely probable. Whither was he going? What were his intentions? Would he cross above Washington, and with his army of 40,000 veterans, capture the disorganized mass of 160,000 men there cowering under the heavy guns of the engineers' forts, expel the Federal officials from Washington, plant the battle-flag of the Confederacy on the Capital of the United States, conquer an acknowledgment and recognition by the powers, and achieve the independence of the South? Or, would he cross the Blue Ridge, pass the Potomac, beyond that barrier of mountains, and hold their defiles while reinforcements poured down the Valley of the Shenandoah, and his victorious columns swept through Pennsylvania and laid Philadelphia under contribution, and thus transfer the seat of war to Union territory and conquer a peace there? These were the terrible possibilities of the hour to the Union chiefs.

On the 1st of September the President sought an interview with General McClellan, who was then absolutely without a command, and told him that he had reason to believe that the Army of the Potomac was not cheerfully co-operating with and supporting General Pope; that "he had always been a friend of mine," says McClellan in his report, and asked him "as a special favor to use my influence in correcting this state of things, to telegraph Fitz John Porter or some other of my friends, and try to do away with any feeling that might exist; that I could rectify the evil and that no one else could."

This picture of the Commander-in-Chief of the armies of a great nation interceding with his subordinate, whom he had permitted to be disgraced within the preceding week, to use his personal influence to persuade soldiers to do their duty, is certainly an interesting one. It proves that they knew and feared McClellan's power.

On the next day, September 2d, Mr. Lincoln verbally directed McClellan to take command of the army. He proceeded at once with extraordinary energy to re-organize it. He constituted his right wing, under command of Major-General Burnside, of the Ninth Corps under Reno and First Corps under Hooker. His centre, under Sumner, consisted of the Twelfth Corps, Mansfield, and Second Corps, Sumner.

His left wing was constituted of Sixth Corps, Franklin, and Couch's Division of the Fourth Corps. Sykes' Division of the Fifth Corps followed in the main the march of the centre. The right wing and centre numbered about 30,000 men each and the left wing

about 20,000. Sykes' Division consisted of 6,000 men and the Cavalry under Pleasonton of 4,500.

The authorities in Washington were in such panic that they would not permit McClellan to move out until he had left 72,000 men behind him to defend the Capital. During the ensuing fourteen days Halleck was constantly telegraphing McClellan that he must be careful lest Lee should evade him and pounce down on the defenceless city. Therefore, when McClellan moved north of Washington, he kept his left along the north bank of the Potomac, and his right extended toward the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, so as to cover the approaches to both Baltimore and Washington. Lee's army was divided into two Corps, the First under Longstreet, with the Divisions of R. H. Anderson, Hood, McLaws and J. G. Walker, and the Second, under Jackson, with the Divisions of Jackson, Ewell, A. P. Hill and D. H. Hill.

Longstreet's First Corps consisted of 15,855 men, Jackson's Second Corps of 11,400. With him also was the Cavalry Division of J. E. B. Stuart, comprising the brigades of Fitz Lee, Hampton and Robertson, the latter under Mumford—the whole, probably, for there are no reports of the Cavalry, numbering as many as 4,500. His Artillery is estimated at 3,000 effective men. I follow Colonel Taylor's laborious and exact statement as to Lee's numbers, and General McClellan's as to his own.

On September 4th Lee's army was concentrated about Leesburg. McClellan had moved his Second, Ninth and Twelfth Corps and Couch's Division to the north side of the Potomac and north of Washington on the Seventh-street Road and to Tenallytown. The Cavalry, under Pleasonton, was pushed along the river to watch the fords in the neighborhood of Poolesville. On the afternoon of September 4th D. H. Hill sent Anderson's Brigade to fire on the Federal trains across the Potomac at Berlin, and, with two other Brigades, drove away the Federal Cavalry pickets near the mouth of Monocacy and crossed at White's ford. During the night of the 4th and day of the 5th Lee's whole army crossed at the same place, the Cavalry, under Stuart, bringing up the rear.

The Infantry camped that night at the Three Springs, in Frederick county, nine miles from Frederick. The Cavalry passed at once to the flank and extended an impenetrable veil of pickets across Montgomery and Frederick counties from the Potomac to New Market, situated beyond the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and on the National

Turnpike from Baltimore to Frederick. Robertson's Brigade, under Mumford, was posted on the right with his advance at Poolesville, Hampton's at Hyattstown, and Fitz Lee's at New Market. Cavalry headquarters were established at Urbana, eight miles southwest of Frederick, and in the rear of the centre of the line thus established. This was the position on the night of September 5th. On the 6th Lee moved his Infantry to Frederick, the Cavalry retaining its line. On the same day McClellan moved out as far as Rockville, which brought him within fifteen miles of Stuart's pickets. By the 9th he had cautiously pushed out some eight or nine miles further, the right wing, under Burnside, occupying Brookville, the centre, under Sumner, Middlebrook, and Franklin, on the left, Darnestown, while Couch was kept close on the Potomac at the mouth of Seneca. The position thus taken by McClellan was a defensive one on the ridges along the line of Seneca Creek, and was intended by him to be occupied in defensive battle. He had no idea of attacking, and, as far as can be seen, his single hope was to interpose such a force in front of Washington as might best defend an advance from the conquering legions of Lee.

General McClellan was undoubtedly overpowered by his own estimate of the forces, moral, political and military, of his adversary. He knew Lee's character and his career in Mexico. He knew the value of personality in war. And he knew that those forces were beyond estimate greater than his. He believed, and it was not discreditable to an honorable and high-spirited man to believe, that the army which had overcome him before Richmond was numerically superior to his own forces. He so represented to Halleck and Stanton again and again. In the battles before Richmond General McClellan held under his control for actual operations 115,102 effectives. During the same period Lee controlled 80,835 men. Yet, on June 25th, 1862, McClellan reported to Stanton, Secretary of War, that Lee's force was stated to be 200,000, and on June 26th he states that the Secret Service reports his force to be 180,000, which he does not consider excessive. Therefore, after the defeats around Richmond and after the disasters of Second Manassas, McClellan believed and so reported that the troops under Lee amounted to 97,445. We can sympathize with and appreciate the feelings with which, on September 4th, in command of 90,000 soldiers of the campaigns of the Valley, of the Seven Days' Battles and of Second Manassas, he left the shelter of the fortifications at Washington to seek for, and give battle to, Lee with

97,445 fighting men. His men were demoralized, his officers, not yet working in that accord absolutely necessary for perfect discipline, all esprit lost and destroyed. The miracle that McClellan performed was, that in fourteen days on the march, in the presence of a victorious enemy, he brought order out of chaos; he established something of discipline and he breathed into his incongruous mass something of the old elan of the Army of the Potomac. The wonder is not that he made them fight so well at South Mountain and Sharpsburg, but that he made them fight at all. It is not discreditable to him, his generals or his soldiers for us to believe that they sought a rendezvous for which they were not anxious. This view of the condition of McClellan's mind and that of his army will account for many things otherwise incomprehensible in the events of the succeeding ten days.

While McClellan marched out of Washington to protect the Capital against an army which he believed to be overwhelming, he was handicapped still more by the apprehensions of the Washington government.

They distrusted him. He had no confidence in them. They were pervaded with apprehensions that Lee's movement into Western Maryland was a strategic ruse to secure from McClellan an abandonment of the Capital in order that Lee might, by a quick march, turn his left and seize Washington before he could strike a blow in its defence. During the whole of the Union General's advance into Maryland he was trammelled and harassed by constant cautions from the General-in-Chief that he should protect that city. He says in his report:

"I left Washington on the 7th of September. At this time it was known that the mass of the Rebel army had passed up the south side of the Potomac in the direction of Leesburg, and that a portion of that army had crossed into Maryland, but whether it was their intention to cross their whole force with a view to turn Washington by a flank movement down the north bank of the Potomac, to move on Baltimore or to invade Pennsylvania, were questions which at that time we had no means of determining. This uncertainty as to the intentions of the enemy obliged me, up to the 13th of September, to march cautiously and to advance the army in such order as continually to keep Washington and Baltimore covered and at the same time to hold the troops well in hand, so as to be able to concentrate and follow rapidly if the enemy took the direction of Pennsylvania, or to

return to the defence of Washington if, as was greatly feared by the authorities, the enemy should be merely making a feint with a small force to draw off our army, while with their main forces they stood ready to seize the first favorable opportunity to attack the Capital." On September 9th Halleck telegraphed to McClellan: "It may be the enemy's object to draw off the mass of our forces and then attempt to attack from the Virginia side of the Potomac."

Lee's 35,000 men were on that day preparing to march northward from Frederick.

On the 12th President Lincoln telegraphed McClellan: "I have advices that Jackson is crossing the Potomac at Williamsport, and probably the whole Rebel army will be drawn from Maryland. Please do not let him get off without being hurt."

On the 13th Halleck telegraphed him: "I am of opinion that the enemy will send a small column towards Pennsylvania to draw off your forces in that direction, then suddenly move on Washington with the forces south of the Potomac, and those he may cross over."

Jackson, McLaws and Walker were on that day investing Harper's Ferry.

On the 14th Halleck telegraphed: "Scouts report a large force still on the Virginia side of the Potomac; if so, I fear you are exposing your left and rear."

Harper's Ferry surrendered at 8 A. M. on September 15th, and on September 16th, the day after the surrender of Harper's Ferry, he again telegraphed: "I think, however, you will find that the whole force of the enemy in your front has crossed the river. I fear now more than ever that they will re-cross at Harper's Ferry or below and turn your left, thus cutting you off from Washington. This has appeared to me to be a part of their plan, and hence my anxiety on the subject. A heavy rain might prevent it."

This was the day when McClellan was feeling along Lee's front at Sharpsburg and the day before the battle. *No heavy rain ever did prevent Lee's movements or hinder Jackson, Longstreet or the Hills.*

Western Maryland is traversed by the Catoctin range of mountains, running through Frederick county from the Potomac to Pennsylvania. Parallel and about eight miles northwest runs the South Mountain, the extension through Maryland of the Blue Ridge, the dividing line between Frederick and Washington counties. From two miles and a-half to three miles northwest of South Mountain runs the Elk Ridge from the Potomac, extending almost eight miles parallel to the South Mountain.

The Valley of the Monocacy is east of the Catoctin. Between it and South Mountain is Middleton Valley, and between South Mountain and Elk Ridge is Pleasant Valley. Along the base of the Blue Ridge in Virginia the Shenandoah empties into the Potomac. At the confluence of the two rivers is Harper's Ferry. It is dominated on the Maryland side by the southern terminus of Elk Ridge, called Maryland Heights, and on the Virginia side by the northern end of Blue Ridge, known as Loudon Heights. Harper's Ferry is of itself a *cul de sac*—indefensible against the dominating heights on either side. Both Loudon Heights and Maryland Heights are accessible from the rear by roads, and can be carried by a determined attack.

When Lee crossed into Maryland he knew that 11,000 Federal troops were stationed at Winchester, Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry. After he had crossed he was informed that they had retired from Winchester. He supposed, as he had a right to expect, that they would evacuate the line of the upper Potomac and withdraw by way of Hagerstown into Pennsylvania. It is singular, but true, that whenever Lee anticipated his adversary's making a blunder he was never disappointed. Whenever he relied upon his acting upon sound rules of strategy his expectations always failed. So it was that when he relied upon the evacuation of Harper's Ferry he found that he was entirely mistaken in his calculations.

On the 9th of September he learned that the forces in the lower Valley had been concentrated at Harper's Ferry. He sent Colonel Lije White to Knoxville to ascertain the facts, and he so reported. In order to dispose of this threat upon his flank and rear, he at once set his army in motion, directing Major-General J. G. Walker to proceed by the Virginia side to occupy Loudon Heights, Major-General McLaws, with Major-General R. H. Anderson, to take possession of Maryland Heights, and Jackson, with the Second Corps, to proceed by way of Williamsport and Martinsburg to invest Harper's Ferry on the line between the Potomac and the Shenandoah. General Jackson was directed to take charge of the movement, and the detached columns were ordered to be in position on Friday, the 12th. Longstreet, with eleven Brigades, and Hill, with five, were ordered to take position at Boonsboro, where the rest of the army was ordered to join them after the reduction of Harper's Ferry. At daylight on the 10th his army moved on the National Road from Frederick to Hagerstown. McClellan explains the tardiness of his movements, because, he says, his troops and trains moving on one road would have made a column

fifty miles long. Lee found no such difficulty. His army swept along the broad turnpike in three close parallel columns, Artillery and trains in the centre and Infantry on each side.

THE FABLE OF BARBARA FRITCHIE.

The march of the Army of Northern Virginia through the streets of Frederick on the 10th of September was the occasion of a scandalous invention in derogation of its honor, which has gone to the world as the "Ballad of Barbara Fritchie." The point and the pathos of this creation of the imagination is in the description of a scene in which an aged and decrepit woman, fired by patriotism and nerved by a courage in which the men were lacking, flaunted the flag of the United States defiantly in the face of the Confederate column as it swept through Frederick; that, by order of Stonewall Jackson, a volley was fired at her and her flag, and then seized by sudden remorse the ideal Confederate hero passed on with heart wrung by grief and head bowed by shame for the unnatural crime of which he had been guilty. It transmits in smooth and melodious verse the explicit statement that one of the chief historical characters of the Confederacy—he whom the love of his contemporaries and the veneration of the good in the whole world have singled out and apotheosized as the hero, the genius, the martyr of the cause of honor, chivalry and patriotism—that Stonewall Jackson ordered Confederate soldiers to fire on an old woman feebly flaunting a flag out of a garret window, and then, overwhelmed with remorse and grief, hung his head and fled from the scene of his shame. The function of the singer has in all time been akin to that of the prophet. While the latter gave expression to the will and the purposes of the gods, the former moulds into words the hopes, the memories and the aspirations of races, of people and of nations. The real poet is under obligations to truth, for truth lives and stirs the heart and perpetuates heroic deeds and the desire to do them. Therefore, there is no excuse for this slander and libel on the Confederate cause, the Confederate soldier and the Confederate hero. Not only is every allegation in the story of Barbara Fritchie false, but there never existed foundation for it. I was born in Frederick and lived there until May, 1861, when I joined the Confederate army. I had known Barbara Fritchie all my life. I knew where she lived as well as I knew the town clock. At that time she was eighty-four years old and had been bedridden for some time. She never saw a Confederate soldier and prob-

ably no one of any kind. Her house was at the corner of Patrick Street and the Town Creek Bridge. The troops marched by there during a portion of the 10th of September. On that morning General Jackson and his staff rode into the town to the house of the Rev. Dr. Ross, the Presbyterian clergyman there, and paid a visit to Mrs. Ross, who was the daughter of Governor McDowell, of Lexington, Virginia, where Jackson lived and whom he knew well. After the visit to Mrs. Ross at the parsonage, which was next to the Presbyterian church and not on the same street nor near Mrs. Fritchie's house, he rode at the head of his staff by the courthouse, down through the Mill Alley, up to Patrick Street, some distance beyond the Fritchie house. He never passed it and in all probability never saw it. It is needless to say that no such incident as that described by Whittier could have occurred in the Confederate army, which was composed of men in all stations of life, fired by enthusiasm for the cause of honor, liberty and patriotism. The highest admiration and the warmest love of principle were the forces which directed and controlled it.

It is quite possible that the future historian may designate the passion that moved it for four years of privation, of starvation, of battle, wounds and death as fanatical. But it was devotion to the highest ideal which men or nations have ever created for themselves. Therefore, it was impossible for such men, so led, to perpetrate the puerile act laid to their charge, and no such thing occurred anywhere, in Frederick or elsewhere.

I doubt not that women and children waved Union flags in the faces of Confederates. Such incidents were natural and doubtless did occur, but the soldiers never resented it; on the contrary, it amused them, and the only punishment I ever heard of being administered to the fair patriots were witticism, more or less rough, from the ready tongues of the privates in the ranks.

Jackson moved rapidly in advance to Boonsboro, then turned to the left, crossed the Potomac at Williamport, passed through Martinsburg and closed in on Harper's Ferry by noon of the 13th, a march of sixty-two miles in three days and a-half. McLaws turned off the National Road at Middletown and passed over the South Mountain range by Crampton's Gap into Pleasant Valley. After some sharp fighting he got possession of Maryland Heights on the afternoon of the 13th. Walker got to his place on Loudoun Heights during the evening of the 13th. At night of the 13th, therefore, the

investment of Harper's Ferry was complete. Escape was impossible. Rescue by McClellan was the only salvation. General Lee, with Longstreet and the Reserve Artillery, had in the meantime gone into camp at Hagerstown and D. H. Hill at Boonsboro.

We left McClellan on the 9th, occupying the ridges along the line of the Seneca. On the 10th he moved his centre some five miles further to Damascus and Clarksburg and his left to Poolesville and Barnesville, where he came in contact with Stuart's lines. The duty of the Cavalry was only to cover the movements of Lee, which had begun that morning, and Stuart merely held his position until pressed back by McClellan's Infantry. On the 11th he withdrew, still spreading out a cordon of Cavalry, covering a front of about twenty miles between the Federal and Confederate armies.

Mumford, with the Second and Twelfth Virginia Cavalry (the rest of Robertson's Brigade being on detached service), was moved back to Jefferson and thence to Crampton's Gap. Fitz Lee was directed to move from New Market around Frederick to the north and cross the Catoclin range, six miles above Frederick, while Hampton retired leisurely to Frederick, six miles distant. Familiarity with the topography since boyhood, refreshed by personal inspection this summer, has only increased my admiration for Stuart's genius for war. In a strange country, with ordinary maps as his guides, his dispositions could not have been excelled if he were operating over territory carefully described and accurately portrayed by the most skillful engineers. From the moment Lee crossed the Potomac Stuart covered his positions and his movements with impenetrable secrecy, so far as McClellan was concerned, and he concealed Lee's operations so perfectly that McClellan reported that on September 10th "he received from his scouts information which rendered it quite probable that General Lee's army was in the vicinity of Frederick, but whether his intention was to move toward Baltimore or Pennsylvania was not then known."

Lee's whole army had in fact been for five days encamped around Frederick, and was then in full march up the National Road. If it had not been for an extraordinary misfortune McClellan never would have divined Lee's purposes until after Harper's Ferry had been taken and, with his army well in hand, reinforced, refreshed and rested, Lee would have delivered battle on his own conditions, with time and place of his own selection. No one, Union or Confederate, doubts what the issue of such a struggle would have been. The

army of McClellan would have been routed, Baltimore and Washington opened to the Confederates and then—what? This misfortune to the cause of the Confederacy will be described hereafter.

On September 11th, Lee having his army well disposed beyond the South Mountain, and the two ranges of Catoctin and South Mountain having been interposed between his Infantry and the Federal advance, McClellan threw forward his right, the Ninth and First Corps, under Burnside, to New Market, taking the place of Fitz Lee's Cavalry. He then began what was described as a grand left wheel, his right turning gradually so as to be advanced.

Fitz Lee kept his rear guard close to Burnside and well advised of his movements; Hampton, with Stuart and the general staff, moved through Frederick. Stuart desired to defend the passes in the Catoctin and ordered Mumford to hold the gap at Jefferson for that purpose, but Burnside pressed up the National Road on the 12th, and Pleasanton's Cavalry being unable to make an impression on Stuart, forced his Infantry on him and Hampton in the streets of Frederick. One gun was placed in position in Patrick street, in front of the foundry, supported by a regiment and a-half of Infantry and a body of Cavalry. Hampton was sitting on his horse with his staff in front of the City Hotel, some eight hundred yards off, in nearly a direct line. He sent the Second South Carolina Cavalry, Colonel, now Senator, M. C. Butler, rattling down the street with a yell and a vim that might have started the stones out of the sidewalk.

Lieutenant Meighan led the advance squadron. The South Carolinians rode over guns, horses, Infantry and Artillery. Colonel Moore, Twenty-third Ohio, was captured, five horses attached to the piece were killed, so that it could not be taken off; it was upset in the fray. Ten prisoners were carried off. This lesson taught Burnside caution, and Stuart held the pass at Hagans, where the National Road crosses the Catoctin, five miles from Frederick, all the rest of the twelfth with the Jeff Davis Legion and two guns.

On the 12th, then, Stuart's Cavalry held the Catoctin range, and McClellan had advanced his right, under Burnside, to Frederick; his centre, under Sumner, to Urbana and Ijamsville, while his left, under Franklin, still dragged behind close to the Potomac. Burnside was in contact with Stuart's Cavalry at Hagans, but Sumner and Franklin were at least twelve miles from an enemy while they camped at Urbana and Barnesville.

The next day, September 13th, Walker, McLaws and Jackson completed the investment of Harper's Ferry.

Halleck and Stanton were telegraphing McClellan with hot wires to save the army and material there. Frederick is twenty miles from Harper's Ferry. Stuart, on leaving Frederick, sent instructions to Fitz Lee to gain the enemy's rear and ascertain his force. For the purpose of delaying his advance and giving all time possible for the capture of Harper's Ferry and subsequent concentration of Lee's army, he called back Hampton's Brigade on the morning of the 13th to assist the Jeff Davis Legion in holding the gap at Hagans. They did so until mid-day of the 13th, when absolutely forced out of it by the irresistible pressure of Burnside's two Corps, and during the 13th the Cavalry made two separate stands against the Federal Infantry in Middletown Valley for the purpose of gaining time and retarding the advance. By noon of the 13th, however, Burnside had obtained possession of the top of the mountain at Hagans. From that point is a most extensive and lovely view. Middletown Valley, rich in orchards, farmhouses and barns and flocks and herds spread before you down to the Potomac and Virginia on the left, and up to Mason's and Dixon's line and Pennsylvania on the right. The South Mountain or Blue Ridge stretches a wall of green on the western side of this elysian scene, while Catoctin forms its eastern bound. From Hagans the gap at Harper's Ferry is plainly visible. With a good glass you can see through it to the river and hills beyond. On the Maryland Heights was a high tower, erected for a signal station, and flags on it, and at Hagans it could have been readily distinguished. They were not eighteen miles apart. Rockets from the Maryland Heights and from Hagans would have been easily visible to either point. Notwithstanding this, although Burnside obtained possession of Hagans by noon on the 13th, before Walker had occupied Loudoun Heights or McLaws had taken Maryland Heights, no attempt is recorded to have been made by either force to communicate by signal with the other during the half of the day so pregnant with fate for the garrison at Harper's Ferry. McClellan fired signal guns incessantly from the head of his relieving columns. They produced the impression upon Miles and White, at Harper's Ferry, of heavy cannonading and a great battle somewhere, and scared them so badly that when the attack was really made upon them, they surrendered a strong position without striking a blow in its defence.

Stuart held tenaciously to his ground until driven from position to position by Infantry, and after mid-day of the 13th he drew back to the pass in the South Mountain where the National Road passes over

it. He found the pass occupied by D. H. Hill, and turned Hampton off to the left and south, to move down Middletown Valley by the foot of the mountain to Crampton's Gap, which he considered the weakest part of Lee's line. Hampton, on arriving at Burkettsville, joined Mumford with his two fragments of regiments.

At night, then, of the 13th this was the position of affairs. Jackson on the Charlestown Road, McLaws on Maryland Heights, and Walker on Loudoun Heights, had completely invested Harper's Ferry. Lee, with Longstreet, was near Hagerstown; D. H. Hill at Boonsboro, with the Brigades of Colquitt, and Garland in the pass through the South Mountain, known to history and the reports as Turner's Gap; Hampton and Mumford guarded Crampton's Gap; Reno's Corps of Burnside's right wing at Middletown, five miles from the top of Turner's Gap. The Corps of Hooker, Sumner, Mansfield and Sykes' Division around Frederick, eight miles from Middletown and twelve from the top of Turner's Gap. Franklin was at Buckeystown, twelve miles from Crampton's Gap, with Couch's Division three miles to his left at Licksville. The roads were in capital condition. On the National Road three columns could move abreast, with numerous roads over Catoctin across Middletown Valley. Over the road from Buckeystown Franklin could have marched his troops in a double column to Crampton's. McClellan held his troops everywhere within six hours' march of the passes of the South Mountain, which were defended at Crampton's by Cavalry and at Turner's by two weak brigades of Infantry. Lee's army was divided in part by the narrow Pleasant Valley. If a march had been made by Reno at sundown on Turner's Gap, and by Franklin on Crampton's, they would have been in possession of both passes by daylight of the 14th. With Franklin in possession of Crampton's Gap, he would have been five miles from Maryland Heights and Harper's Ferry. With Reno in Turner's Gap, the head of McClellan's columns would have been driven between D. H. Hill and Longstreet on the one side and Jackson, McLaws and Walker on the other; and McClellan could have isolated and fought either before the other could come to its assistance.

The caution with which General McClellan had moved forty-five miles in nine days might well be explained by his lack of information of the disposition of the troops of his adversary.

But on the 13th, in the afternoon, by the most extraordinary fortune of war, McClellan received precise and official information of

the exact position of each of the Confederate Divisions on that very day and of the strategy and purposes of Lee. He was put in possession of Lee's orders to his Corps Commanders, directing the details of the movements on Harper's Ferry. How this came about will probably never be known. It was a copy of Special Order No. 191, directed to D. H. Hill. There were two official copies directed to General Hill. His Adjutant-General states emphatically that only one was received and that is now in General Hill's possession. The Count of Paris says it was picked up in the house which had served as Hill's headquarters. Hill lived in a tent and was at no house. Singular to say, the incident is unknown in Frederick, and no reliable information can be obtained there. Colonel E. M. Wright, who commanded McLellan's escort, gives me the most satisfactory explanation that has yet been made. He says that the paper was captured near Middletown, by some of Col. Dahlgren's scouts, who ran in on a lot of Confederate officers, lunching under a tree. In their hurry to get off, they left this paper and a tobacco pouch. The order was as follows:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
September 9th, 1862.

This army will resume its march to-morrow, taking the Hagerstown Road. General Jackson's command will form the advance, and after passing Middletown with such portion as he may select, take the route toward Sharpsburg, cross the Potomac, and by Friday night take possession of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, and capture such of the enemy as may be at Martinsburg, and intercept such of the enemy as may attempt to escape from Harper's Ferry. General Longstreet's command will pursue the same road as far as Boonsboro', where it will halt with the reserve, supply and baggage trains of the army. General McLaws, with his own division and that of General R. H. Anderson, will follow General Longstreet. On reaching Middletown he will take the route to Harper's Ferry, and by Friday morning possess himself of the Maryland Heights, and endeavor to capture the enemy at Harper's Ferry and vicinity.

General Walker, with his division, after accomplishing the object in which he is now engaged, will cross the Potomac at Cheek's Ford, ascend its right bank to Lovettsville, and take possession of Loudoun Heights, if practicable, by Friday morning—Key's Ford on his left, and the road between the end of the mountain and the Potomac on

his right. He will, as far as practicable, co-operate with General McLaws and General Jackson in intercepting the retreat of the enemy. General D. H. Hill's division will form the rear guard of the army, pursuing the road taken by the main body. The reserve Artillery, ordnance and supply trains, etc., will precede General Hill. General Stuart will detach a squadron of Cavalry to accompany the commands of Generals Longstreet, Jackson and McLaws, and with the main body of the Cavalry will cover the route of the army, and bring up all stragglers that may have been left behind. The commands of Generals Jackson, McLaws and Walker, after accomplishing the objects for which they have been detached, will join the main body of the army at Boonsboro' or Hagerstown. Each regiment on the march will habitually carry its axes in the regimental ordnance wagons, for use of the men at their encampments to procure wood, etc.

By command of General R. E. Lee.

R. H. CHILTON,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

Major-General D. H. Hill.

This order was delivered to General McClellan at his headquarters at Frederick during the afternoon of the 13th.

He read it, threw up his hand in great enthusiasm and exclaimed to the surrounding staff, "Gentlemen, I have got Lee at last!" He then read the order aloud to the bystanders. And now occurs one of the most marvelous incidents of this most marvelous occurrence.

While General McClellan was reading this order to his staff with emphasis and enthusiasm a citizen was hanging on the outside of the circle drinking in every word.

His quick intelligence at once appreciated the prodigious importance of the information. He withdrew, promptly sent the description of what had occurred to Stuart, who was then in Middletown. Stuart sent it on by courier to Lee at Hagerstown, who received it before daylight. Lee, without the delay of a second, saddled up and rode to Longstreet's headquarters, woke him up and started him back to South Mountain to help D. H. Hill. He got there in time to stop the way until daylight on the 15th, when Harper's Ferry surrendered. Lee also informed Jackson at Harper's Ferry of this incident. Such a singular connection between the commanders-in-chief of two opposing armies, by which each had exact information of the knowledge possessed by the other, I have never read of in any history.

McClellan received this copy of Lee's order during the afternoon. At 6.30 P. M. of that day he ordered Franklin to move at daybreak on the 14th on Burkettsville.

At that hour all of his army was in camp. Most of his Corps had marched about six miles that day. Only two or three Divisions had marched as far as eight miles. A vigorous march of six hours would have put Burnside through Turner's Gap, and Franklin through Crampton's, by daylight of the 14th, Longstreet and Hill would have been cut off from the rest of the army, and McLaws cooped up in Pleasant Valley with 6,500 men, by Franklin with 12,300 at the one end of the Valley, and Miles with 11,000 at the other.

But such prompt action was not taken by the Federal Commander-in-Chief. He put his troops in motion, on the morning of the 14th, after a comfortable breakfast, and they proceeded leisurely enough to Burkettsville and Middletown.

On that morning Stuart, finding nothing in front of Crampton's, had sent Hampton down to Sandy Hook, the point between the South Mountain and the Potomac, and left Mumford with his handful of Cavalry to guard Crampton's. He had the 2d Virginia Cavalry, 125 men, 12th Virginia Cavalry, 75 men, and two fragments of Infantry regiments of Mahone's Brigade. About noon Franklin arrived. Mumford dismounted his Cavalry, and deployed them behind a stone-wall on each side of the road, at the foot of the mountain, on each flank of the Infantry. His Artillery, consisting of Chew's Battery and a section of Navy Howitzers belonging to the Portsmouth Battery, was posted on the slope of the mountain. Colonel Parham, commanding Mahone's Brigade, soon came up with two more regiments numbering 300 men, and were similarly posted by Mumford.

Franklin promptly formed Slocum's Division on the right of the road leading through the gap, and Smith's Division on the left, and moved them forward. Mumford clung to his position with tenacity, and it was only after three hours struggle that the two Divisions were enabled to drive the dismounted Cavalry, and Mahone's small Brigade, and then only because they were out of ammunition. *Mumford's entire force did not exceed a thousand men.*

Stuart reports that General Semmes, who held a gap next below, probably a mile off, rendered no assistance of any kind. General Howell Cobb at last arrived with two regiments and requested Mumford to post them. While he was doing so, in a second line, in rear of his first, the Infantry of the first, whose ammunition had given

out, fell back. At this, Cobb's regiments broke in panic, and went pell mell over the mountain, carrying back with them the rest of Cobb's Brigade, which was moving to their assistance. Slocum's advance, Cobb's fugitives, and the dismounted Cavalry, all arrived at about the same time, in the dark, at the forks of the Rohrer'sville Road. Stuart came up, and assisted in rallying, and reforming the Infantry. A line was formed across Pleasant Valley, and Franklin's further progress stopped.

Turner's Gap is six miles north of Crampton's. It is passed by the National Road in a series of easy grades. The mountains on either side, command the approaches to the pass. A mile west of Middletown, at Koogle's Bridge, a country road leaves the broad turnpike on the left, or south side of the pike, and passes over South Mountain, a mile south of Turner's. It is the road which had been cut by Braddock in his campaign, and is now known as the Old Sharpsburg Road. It is steep on the eastern approach. On the north of Turner's, the mountain ridge subsides to an opening or recess between two spurs. A country road runs up this ravine or recess, and turning up the mountain, ascends, and passing along the side near the summit, joins the National Road in Turner's Gap, a hundred yards or so from the top. McClellan is in error in calling this the Old Hagerstown Road, and has caused the error to be perpetuated by all subsequent writers. The old stage road and trail, from Frederick to Hagerstown, passes the South Mountain, six miles north of Turner's Gap.

It was D. H. Hill's business to hold the gap until the reduction of Harper's Ferry should be effected. Stuart had led him to believe, on the night of the 13th, that only two Federal Brigades were advancing on the National Road, so he ordered Colquitt and Garland back from Boonsboro, three miles off, and put them in the pass. Early next morning, he ordered up Anderson's Brigade. It only got there in time to take the place of Garland's command, which was driven back, demoralized by his death. The 9th Corps, General Reno, marched from Middletown at daylight of the 14th.

Cox's Division in advance turned into the old Sharpsburg Road at Koogle's Mills, and followed by the rest of the Corps pressed for the top of the mountain. Hill sent Garland to repel this attack, but Garland was killed, his command driven back, and it was rallied with Anderson's Brigade, together with which it held the Federal left, back during the remainder of the day. It killed Reno, however.

Colquitt was placed in the centre astride of the turnpike. Later Ripley was sent to the right, to support Anderson; and Rhodes to the left, to seize a commanding peak of the mountain there. Thus were Hill's five Brigades posted. The whole of the Ninth Corps was pushed up to the position, secured by Cox, when he drove back Garland on Hill's right. Hooker's First Corps turned from the National Road at Bolivar, leaving Gibbons on the pike, and pressed up the mountain road to Hill's left. Neither the Ninth Corps on the Federal left, nor the First Corps on the right made much progress. By four in the afternoon Longstreet came up with the Brigades of Evans, Pickett, Kemper, and Jenkins, which he placed on the left, and Hood, Whiting, Drayton, and D. R. Jones, which he posted on the right. But the men were exhausted by a forced march of twelve or fourteen miles over a hot and dusty road, and General Longstreet himself was not acquainted with the topography of the position, nor the situation of the Federals. Hill says, that if the reinforcements had reported to him, he would have held all the positions, right and left of the gap. As it was, the Ninth Corps made no further advance, but was held firmly in the position taken in the morning from Garland; but Hooker worked, and fought his way to the possession of a commanding spur on his right, which dominated the gap itself, and the position on the Confederate left. At 9 o'clock at night fighting ceased along the whole line, with Hill in possession of the gap, and of the left, and Hooker firmly seated on the mountain on the right, where in the morning he could control the whole line. Fitz Lee having gained McClellan's rear, and located his headquarters at Frederick, waited all day of the 13th, at Worman's Mill, just north of Frederick, picking up stragglers and information. He then crossed the Catoctin Range, five miles north of Middletown; and the South Mountain, some miles above Turner's Gap, and joined Hill at Boonsboro late in the afternoon of the 14th. He relieved the Infantry before dawn on the morning of the 15th, and Hill and Longstreet withdrew noiselessly and rapidly through Boonsboro to Sharpsburg, eight miles off, where they took position before noon of the 15th.

We will now return to Harper's Ferry. McLaws having constructed a road up the Maryland Heights and placed his Artillery in position during the 14th, while this fighting was going on at Crampton's Gap and at Turner's Gap, signaled to Jackson that he was ready; whereupon Jackson signaled the order to both Walker and McLaws: "Fire at such positions of the enemy as will be most effective." His

Infantry was moved up the road from Charlestown toward Harper's Ferry. At daylight the circle of fire blazed out around Miles, the Federal Commander of Harper's Ferry, and by 8 A. M. he surrendered 11,000 men, 73 guns and immense supplies of food and ammunition. The position on the morning of the 15th, therefore, was this.

McClellan's right, two Corps under Burnside, was through Turner's Gap, eight miles from Sharpsburg. The centre, two Corps under Sumner, was well closed up on Burnside; Franklin, who had been joined by Couch during the night, held eighteen thousand men in Pleasant Valley, behind McLaws, and was also eight miles from Sharpsburg. Lee, with Longstreet and D. H. Hill, occupied a position on the west side of Antietam Creek, utterly isolated from his nearest reinforcements, which were at Harper's Ferry, seventeen and a half miles off, McLaws cut off in Pleasant Valley with no escape, except first to capture Harper's Ferry, and then cross the Potomac, and passing through that place, rejoin Jackson and A. P. Hill. Walker was on Loudoun Heights, Jackson near Bolivar Heights. A march of three hours would have brought the heads of Franklin's and Burnside's columns together in front of Lee, and no earthly power could have prevented the whole of McClellan's 90,000 men being precipitated on Longstreet and D. H. Hill with 9,262, and all the reserved Artillery, ammunition and ordnance of the Confederate Army.

After General McClellan, at Frederick, on the 13th, received official and exact information of Lee's dispositions and purposes, his delay in not pushing a vigorous pursuit is utterly incomprehensible. But this delay on the morning of the 15th, is even still more extraordinary. He had heard the firing at Harper's Ferry, and was advised of the surrender that morning. He knew that he had D. H. Hill and Longstreet just in front, and that all the rest of Lee's army was in Virginia, or in Pleasant Valley. Notwithstanding this, it took him from the morning of the 15th, to the afternoon of the 16th, to move eight miles, and get into position to attack Lee. Fitz Lee, with his small Brigade, struck him sharp in the face at Boonsboro, and actually held him back long enough for Lee to form his line at Sharpsburg. General McClellan believed at that time that General Lee had over 97,000 men. He knew that he himself did not have so many, and I am bound to believe, and cannot help believing, that the slowness of his movements from Frederick to find his enemy, and from South Mountain to fight him, was caused by apprehensions of the consequences of the meeting. He is entitled to great credit for

having infused any spirit at all into this mob of routed fugitives, which he met outside of Alexandria on September 2d, just a fortnight before, and he and his subordinates achieved wonders when they got this mob organized, and to fight, as it did fight, on the 17th. But it is clear that McClellan distrusted his ability to stand before Lee.

There was neither distrust nor uncertainty in the conduct of Lee and his lieutenants.

Miles hoisted the white flag at Harper's Ferry at 8 o'clock A. M. on the 15th.

Jackson turned over the details of the surrender to A. P. Hill, and started at once to join Lee. The Divisions of Jackson and Ewell delayed only long enough to supply themselves with provisions from the captured stores, and by an all-night march, by Shepardstown and Boteler's Ford, reached Sharpsburg and reported to Lee on the morning of the 16th. *McClellan's golden opportunity had gone forever.*

JACKSON AND THE FOOT CAVALRY WERE UP.

Antietam Creek flows in a southwesterly course through a rolling country to the Potomac. Though a shallow stream, its banks are steep and rocky, and it is only passable at numerous fords and four bridges.

On the east side, where McClellan was now forming his army for battle, a series of rolling hills, rather overlook the comparatively level country of the west side on which Lee's line was formed. Near the mouth of Antietam is a bridge which was used by no troops during the battle. About a mile southeast of Sharpsburg, is a stone bridge, known as Burnside's Bridge. A mile and a quarter further up the Creek is another bridge on the broad turnpike from Boonsboro and Keedysville to Sharpsburg, which I call the Keedysville Bridge. Two miles further up stream is another bridge above Pry's Mill, known as Pry's Bridge. A mile and a-half east of and parallel to the Antietam is a high range of hills called the Red Hills. On the 16th Lee's line was formed with Longstreet on his right, Toombs being his right and to the right of the Burnside Bridge, D. H. Hill covered the Keedysville Bridge, Hood with his two small Brigades extended the line on D. H. Hill's left, his left thrown somewhat back, to the Hagerstown Pike, and Jackson's Division under J. R. Jones, with its right on the pike at right angles to it in double line, some distance north of the Dunkard Church in a corn-field and woods. Ewell's

Division under Lawton was on the left of Jackson still further beyond, Early being at right angles to Starke, Jackson's left Brigade, and formed Lee's extreme left of Infantry. The space between that point and the Potomac was held by Stuart, with Fitz Lee and Mumford and the Horse Artillery. After the surrender of Harper's Ferry, Hampton passed from Sandy Hook, through the Ferry, back to the east bank and crossing the Antietam by the lowest bridge took position on the right. During the 16th McClellan was making his dispositions with all that pedantry of war which was one of his most distinguishing characteristics. He cleared the summit of the Red Hills of trees, and erected a signal station, that gave him a clear view of Lee, even down the road to Boteler's ford, in the rear of Sharpsburg.

He established himself in elaborate headquarters at Sam Pry's house, on a high hill opposite to the right of Hood's line and slightly in rear, where he could see with the naked eye every movement of the Confederate left. He posted Burnside, with the Ninth Corps, on his left, opposite Toombs, with the bridge between them. He placed Porter in his centre, with two of his Divisions opposite the Keedysville Bridge, and covered the hills on either side of the Keedysville Pike with long range guns. He moved Hooker up stream and passed him over Pry's Bridge, whence he proceeded west as far as the Hagerstown Pike, when he marched south towards Sharpsburg. He soon ran into Hood's skirmish line, but he gained no ground from them, though Early says in his report shells were flying pretty thick. They held their places and darkness put an end to the firing.

The battle of the 17th was mainly fought to the north of Sharpsburg and beyond the Dunkard Church on the Hagerstown Pike. The pike runs nearly due north from Sharpsburg to Hagerstown, probably a mile and a-half west of Antietam Creek. A mile north of Sharpsburg is a Dunkard meeting-house, on the west of the pike, in a wood of hickory and oak. The woods extend on the west side of the pike for a quarter of a mile, then they run west for a hundred and fifty yards, then north for another quarter of a mile, and then westward some distance. Following General Palfrey, I shall call these the west woods. In the space along the pike there were fields of Indian corn of great height and heavy growth. To the east of the corn-fields and the pike was another smaller body of woods, which we will call the east woods. The plateau thus nearly enclosed on three sides by woods is nearly level, but is higher than the west woods. The west woods is full of limestone ledges, running parallel to the open.

About 11 o'clock at night Hood was withdrawn to enable his men to cook, and the Brigades of Lawton and Trimble took his place. Hooker withdrew up the Hagerstown Pike and went into bivouac, his pickets close to those of the Confederates, which in some places were not over one hundred yards apart. The troops of Jackson extending at right angles across the Hagerstown Pike and some hundred yards in advance of the Dunkard Church slept in line of battle, their skirmish line well out. They had been marching and fighting since the morning of the 10th, when they left Frederick and had marched all the preceding night. Gaunt with exercise, lean with fasting, they were in that physical condition which can by a few days' rest and feeding be made superb. Without fires, their line lay still and grim under the light of the stars. Hooker's men were comfortable, with supper and coffee. The dead silence of midnight was only broken by a stray shot from an advanced picket until way off to the northwest arose a sound, a stir, a hum of muffled noise. It was Mansfield, with his Twelfth Corps, marching into position. He crossed on Hooker's route and took place a mile in his rear. By four in the morning the two armies were astir. With Hooker, there was bustle and cooking, and coffee and pipes. With Jackson, there was only a munching of cold rations and water from the spring. The men stretched themselves and peered out through the darkness that precedes the dawn. By daylight Hooker got into motion, Doubleday's Division on his right, Meade his centre, Ricketts his left. Doubleday's right Brigade, Gibbon, supported by Patrick, was west of the pike. The rest of the Corps was east of it. They moved in two lines, the Brigades of each line themselves formed with front of two regiments and the other two in support. Thus they swept forward through the west woods, through the corn-field, their left striking the east woods. They numbered 14,856 men. They had a full supply of Artillery, which moved in the intervals of Divisions or on the flanks. In the corn-field they struck Jackson's Division, 1,600 strong, and the Brigades of Lawton and Trimble and Hays, with 2,400 men. The Confederate line of battle numbered 4,000 Infantry, well supported by Artillery. As the Federal advance came on Stuart, with his Horse Artillery, from the extreme left, swept their lines with a fierce fire, which cut them down en masse. The musketry and artillery in front swept them down by rank and file. But they pressed on. Their batteries poured grape and cannister into the Confederate line. McClellan's long range guns, east of Antietam, showered shell and shot

into their flank and rear, and Pleasanton crossed four batteries at the Keedysville Bridge and fired in their rear. They were surrounded by a circle of fire from front, right and rear. Hooker's lines came into the corn field, into the west woods through the east woods. And the Foot Cavalry went at them with that yell they had heard at Gaines' Mill and at Second Manassas. Gibbon went back on Patrick, Meade was thrust back out of the corn-field, Ricketts whirled back into the east woods. When the second line of Hooker moved gallantly forward it was hurled back by a blow struck straight in front. When the reserves were brought in, the fierce attack of the Confederates drove them also back through the corn. Hood had come up to the assistance of his comrades, and the Confederate position was intact, but the loss on both sides was fearful. The two lines tore each other to pieces. Hooker was borne from the field badly wounded, and before seven o'clock the First Corps was annihilated for that day. Ricketts lost 1,051 men, Phelps 44 per cent. and Gibbon 380 men. The Confederate loss was as great. Jones and Lawton, Division Commanders, had been carried off disabled or wounded, Starke, who succeeded Jones in command of Jackson's Division, was killed, Lawton's Brigade lost Douglas, its Commander, killed, and five Regimental Commanders out of six and 554 men out of 1,150. Hays lost every Regimental Commander and every member of his staff and 323 out of 550. Walker, commanding Trimble's Brigade, lost three out of four Regimental Commanders and 228 out of 700. Grigsby and Stafford rallied 200 or 300 men of Jackson's Division and kept them in line, but Trimble, Lawton and Hays were so cut up that they could not be brought up again.

Early had been detached at daylight to the left to Stuart, but by the time he reached him had been ordered back in haste to take command of Lawton's Division on Lawton being wounded.

When he got back to the Dunkard Church he found the west woods well in possession of the Federals. On the destruction of Hooker Mansfield had moved forward to take his place with the Twelfth Corps of two Divisions of 10,126 men. He was killed while deploying his troops, but the First Division, under Crawford, moved right down the pike, with Green's Division on his left, marching over the same ground from which Hooker had just been driven. Crawford was met and checked by Grigsby and Stafford with their band of Jackson's Division, and Green was easily held back by Hood. It was now about 9 o'clock.

Two Divisions of Confederates had been nearly destroyed, two Corps of Federals had been exhausted, Burnside still stood motionless in front of the bridge, less than a mile and a-half from the only road to Virginia accessible to Lee for reinforcement or retreat. In front of him was Toombs with three Georgia regiments and Jenkins' Brigade. From his position he could see every movement of the Confederates and each detail of the struggle on the left. Between 9 and 10 o'clock he attempted to carry the bridge by assault and up to 1 o'clock made four other feeble attacks, all of which were repulsed by the Second and Twelfth Georgia, numbering in all 400 men. He threatened, but he forebore to strike.

At 9 o'clock begins the third scene of this battle. Lee's right retaining its position to watch Burnside; his centre standing fast to look after Fitz John Porter across the Keedysville Bridge. His left, D. H. Hill, then Hood and then Early, who had just come in from Stuart with 1,000 muskets, were awaiting the next blow which should fall on them. Sumner, with the Second Corps, had started at 7.20 A. M. to support Hooker. He was then east of the Antietam. His Corps consisted of the Divisions of Richardson, Sedgewick and French, mustering 18,604 men. He crossed at a ford below Pry's Mill, Sedgewick in front, then French, then Richardson. As soon as Sedgewick cleared the ford he moved his three Brigades in parallel columns, heading north straight for the east woods. In the woods they were faced to the left, thus forming three parallel lines moving west. They moved across the corn-field, over the open field beyond into the west woods in full march beyond Jackson's left, then held by Early with his own Brigade and the men under Grigsby and Stafford.

While they moved down to turn Lee's flank Greene, who had been resting for an hour or more, pushed straight from the east woods toward the Dunkard Church in the interval between Hood and Early. Early reported to Jackson that the force was moving toward his flank and asked for reinforcements. Then Greene came out of the east woods; a battery took position near the Dunkard Church, firing on Hood, and the gap between Early and Hood was, in fact, filled by Greene, who had thus inserted himself in the interval. Early had Sedgewick on his front and left flank, cutting him off from retreat to the river. Greene was in his rear and right flank, cutting him off from the rest of the army. The battery was firing two hundred yards from his right and in rear of it, and the Infantry of Greene was pushing on by the battery. General Early says, that "the move-

ments of the enemy were assuming very formidable proportions. My position was now very critical. I looked anxiously to the rear to see the promised reinforcements coming up. The columns on my right and rear and that coming up in front, with which my skirmishers were already engaged, being watched with the most intense interest." *I should think so!*

Greene now pushed rapidly into the woods in rear of the church. There was no time then to watch or to wait. The only reinforcement Early could count on was his own head and heart. Leaving Stafford and Grigsby to hold back the advancing Division of Sedgewick, he whirled his own Brigade by the right flank, parallel to Greene, who had the start of him, but who was unaware of his presence, though only two hundred yards off, and made a race to head him off. His march was covered by ledges of limestone rock, which concealed him until he suddenly swept from behind them, struck Greene full and drove him back through the woods and through the corn-field. General Early remarks, that "he did not intend moving to the front in pursuit, but the Brigade, without awaiting orders, dashed after the retreating column, driving it entirely out of the woods, and notwithstanding my efforts to do so, I did not succeed in stopping it, until its flank and rear had become exposed to the fire of the column on the left,"—*i. e.*, Sedgewick's men. He says his men were not drilled, and only knew enough to obey the command, "Forward." He withdrew it, reformed it; being joined by Semmes' Brigade, two regiments of Barksdale's Brigade and Anderson's Brigade of D. R. Jones' Division on his right and Stafford and Grigsby on his left, swept Sedgewick out of the west woods, and crushed him in one blow. He lost 2,255 men in a moment, General Palfrey writes. The Confederate line marched over them, driving them pell mell straight through the west woods and the corn field and the open ground along the pike. Greene lost 651 men, most of them by Early's assault. General Sumner had attempted to pass entirely around the Confederate left and march into Sharpsburg. The result I have described. No further attack was made in front of the Dunkard Church, or west of the pike; Smith's Division of Franklin's Sixth Corps, took position to prevent a Confederate advance there; Richardson and French of the Second Corps, taking a different direction from Sedgewick, had marched south. McLaws had relieved Hood, who was out of ammunition and had retired to fill cartridge boxes. Moving east of the pike they forced D. H. Hill and McLaws back quite half a mile behind and to

the south of the Dunkard Church. There a country road branches from the turnpike towards the Keedysville Bridge, which is cut into the ground by long use and has strong fences of stone or rail on either side. It is described in reports as the Sunken Road, but is now known on the field of Sharpsburg as the Bloody Lane. Rhodes and Anderson were in the road, and with them probably some of the men from Ripley, Colquitt and Garland, who had been driven from the field. French came on in three lines, but was stopped by the Sunken Road until Col. Barlow, with the 61st and 64th New York Regiments of Richardson's Division, wheeled suddenly at right angles to the road, thus obtaining an enfilading fire, and drove the Confederates out with a loss of prisoners and battle-flags. French and Richardson were driving in the centre, and no organized troops were left to oppose them. Just then General Jackson came up to a Battery that was in rear of Hill's line and asked why they were not engaged. "No orders and no supports," was the reply. "Go in at once," was the curt rejoinder; "you artillerymen are too much afraid of losing your guns." At this time R. H. Anderson, from the right, with 3,500 men reported. He formed a second line, but was soon wounded. Pleasanton added two batteries and five battalions of regulars to the force across the Keedysville Bridge, and poured a destructive fire into the Confederate flank and rear. Richardson and French pressed steadily on. McLaws was used up, Hill had no organized troops, left, R. H. Anderson was shattered to pieces. A firmly held force could have marched straight into Sharpsburg. But after reaching a point between Lee's right and left wings, the Federal advance stopped. McClellan, meantime, had hurried Franklin's Sixth Corps to the support of Sumner, but the latter, after the terrible disaster to Sedgewick, and the great loss to French and Richardson, was unwilling to risk another Corps, because, as he said, a fresh body of troops was necessary to protect them from Jackson's attack. D. H. Hill in the meantime had rallied a few hundred men and led them against Richardson. They were dispersed and driven back. Cols. Iverson and Christie had likewise gathered about two hundred men of three or four North Carolina Regiments, and with them attacked French's flank, but were also driven back. John R. Cooke, with his North Carolina Regiment, held his place with empty muskets, his ammunition exhausted, and waved his battle-flag in the face of the advancing lines. He stood fast with not a cartridge. This boldness appears to have halted the Federal advance on the centre. It was now

past three o'clock ; the battle was over on the left and in the centre. The Confederates held the ground they had occupied in the morning north of the Dunkard Church. The Federals held the ground they had wrested from Hill, McLaws and Anderson in front of Sharpsburg.

The Confederates were used up. Of Jackson's and Ewell's Divisions, Early alone, with the fragments under Stafford and Grigsby, were left. Of D. H. Hill, McLaws and R. H. Anderson's, only scattered squads were held by their officers in a thin formation in front of Sharpsburg. Lee sent Colonel A. P. Mason, his Assistant Adjutant-General, to order Longstreet to withdraw to a rear line to be formed between Sharpsburg and the Potomac. Longstreet sent answer that he dare not move or he would be destroyed. The Federal Reserve in the centre, under Fitz John Porter, threatened to march straight through Lee's army. Its Artillery had crossed the Keedysville Bridge with Sykes' Division of Regulars and closed up on Richardson's left. Toombs held the Burnside Bridge, with D. R. Jones in support ; but a determined attack by the Ninth Corps must of necessity have carried the bridge, marched into Sharpsburg and attacked the Confederate left and centre in rear. Franklin was fresh, Porter was fresh, Burnside was fresh. They were not three miles apart. They were visible to each other and communicating by signals. There was no help for Lee unless A. P. Hill got up in time, and A. P. Hill had been obliged to remain at Harper's Ferry to parole the prisoners and secure the guns and stores taken there. Why Burnside delayed no man can tell. He stood the whole day looking at the battle.

He saw every battery, every line, every attack, every repulse. He saw his own friends march forward with bands playing and colors flying and lines dressed. McClellan highly prized the pomp and circumstance of war, and he trained his people to observe the ceremonies with great particularity. It is recorded that in the desperate struggle of Richardson's Division the Brigade of Caldwell relieved that of Meagher, the one breaking by companies to the front and the other by companies to the rear. This was regular and ornamental, but dangerous under fire. The Confederate tactical movement under similar circumstances would have been that the front Brigade would have laid flat on the ground and the rear Brigade marched over it. It would have been quicker and a more efficient movement. Burnside could not help seeing this, and that the lines went forward,

moved slower, stopped, began firing and then melted away before his eyes. His hesitation, therefore, is incomprehensible. McClellan urged him by order, by orderly, by signal and by staff officer to go in. At last the Ninth Corps was put in motion. Toombs made a gallant defence, but he was brushed away like chaff. He lost half his men, though he was obliged to leave the bridge and upper ford undefended and confined his efforts to the lower ford.

The Brigades of Kemper and Drayton were driven back through Sharpsburg. The Fifteenth South Carolina, Colonel De Saussure, clung to some strong stone houses on the edge of the town, where he held back Wilcox's advance. Jenkins followed Drayton and Pickett, and Evans was then ordered back by Jones.

As the columns of Burnside debouched from the bridge head, they deployed into three lines. As they swept up the rising ground after the retiring Confederates, they passed one line after the other down a slight depression, and then up a swell in the ground toward the village. This conformation stretches northwest and southeast, something like a great trough, through which Burnside's Divisions were passing. D. H. Hill was still on the north of the town, just east of the Hagerstown pike, when Captain Chas. McCann, Pryor's ordnance officer, galloped up to him and pointed out that he was being flanked by the forces which were then passing to his right and rear. A battery was just east of the pike, firing down the trough I have described, and Hill ordered McCann to withdraw it to a more elevated position on the pike. McCann found it was the King William Artillery, Captain Thos. H. Carter, who said he could do better where he was, nearer the enemy, if he was only supported.

Whereupon Hill proceeded to the battery for personal inspection of its operations. Burnside's lines were passing down one side of the trough—over the bottom and up the other side. The Confederate lines had withdrawn, except that De Saussure and the South Carolinians were firing from the stone walls and barns on the edge of the town. Carter was not two hundred yards from the right of the passing lines, with a perfect enfilading fire on them.

And his guns seemed animate and sentient. They *knew* what they had to do, and what they were doing. They sprang forward like live things, roaring and yelling for slaughter as they hurled shot, shell and shrapnell down the full length of the lines passing by them. Hill's and D. H. Anderson's men changed front, rallying by States, and fired into them.

Every time a shell struck the flank of a file McCann threw his hat in air and hurrahed, and grizzly Presbyterian Hill shouted, and the Virginians of the battery yelled, and the guns would leap forward again with an answering roar.

Burnside's lines, sorely shaken, pressed steadily on. The battle was lost, for his advance was within two hundred yards of Lee's only line of communication and retreat. There were no reserves. The last man had been used up. Where was Hill then? Where was the Light Division, with its gallant chief, who loved to liken himself and his command to Picton and that Light Division which was Wellington's right arm and sabre in the Peninsula? De Saussure was holding on with desperate tenacity to the stone barn and houses. Toombs was forming his Georgians well in hand to strike; but they were all that stood between Lee and rout. Just then, up the Shepardstown Road, came the head of Hill's column, with the long, free stride that had brought it seventeen miles from Harper's Ferry and across the Potomac ford since sunrise. McIntosh broke from it in a sweeping gallop and whirled into battery to the right of Toombs, Willie Pegram following, from his right, poured in cannister and grape, but Wilcox and Crook swept like an advancing wall against McIntosh, and he was driven back with loss of horses and limbers.

The Brigades of the Light Division deployed at a double quick. Pender and Brockenborough on the right, Branch, Gregg and Archer on the left, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, Georgia, Tennessee and Alabama joining hands with Toombs and D. R. Jones, they went through Rodman and Wilcox with a rush and saved the day. McIntosh carried his guns ahead of the charging line.

Burnside withdrew to a position in front of the bridge, and later in the afternoon, to the east side of the bridge, having ordered Morell's Division of the Fifth Corps to occupy his position in front of A. P. Hill. As soon as Burnside's repulse was assured, Jackson ordered Stuart to turn the Federal right with his Cavalry and J. G. Walker with his Division to support him. Stuart found McClellan's batteries within 800 yards of the brink of the Potomac, and the movement was deemed impracticable and abandoned.

Lee held his position all the next day, and during the night of the 18th crossed at Boteler's Ford into Virginia. The delicate task of covering his movement was entrusted to Fitz Lee. Stuart, however, during the afternoon crossed the river at an obscure ford with Hamp-

ton's Brigade. On the 19th he re-crossed at Williamsport, supported by some Infantry and Artillery, and by his demonstrations having kept McClellan in doubt as to Lee's intentions, and drawn Couch's Division to resist him, on the 20th he re-passed again to the Virginia side.

Thus ended the First Maryland Campaign. It was undertaken by Lee with the certainty of thereby relieving Virginia for a time from the pressure of war, with the hope of transferring the scene of operations to the North, and with the possibility of the capture of Baltimore and Washington, the recognition of the Confederacy by the Powers, of Independence and of Peace. It accomplished the first, and secured great spoils of prisoners and of guns and of supplies. It failed in the last, first by the blunder of Halleck in retaining possession of Harper's Ferry, when he ought to have evacuated it, but secondly, and principally, by the accident which lost Lee's Special Order No. 191, and thus furnished McClellan with precise official information of the dispositions of Lee's troops and of his future intentions. It was a failure in so far as he did not accomplish what he hoped would be possible, but it was a success in the results achieved and in the loss of time, men and material it inflicted on the Federal side.

The First Maryland Campaign, when we consider the numbers employed, the distances marched, the results achieved, the disparity of forces fought, was an episode unsurpassed in brilliancy of achievement, in self-sacrifice of soldiers, officers and men, in heroic endeavors, and in chivalric gallantry by any chapter in the history of war. Considering Lee's audacity in dividing his small force in the presence of three times his numbers in an unknown and unfriendly country, his fortitude and tenacity in holding on until the object for which he had detached them was accomplished and they could rejoin him, his genius in selecting his position and his skill in handling his troops on the field of battle, and the manner in which he was supported by his lieutenants, their subordinates, and their men, we have a lesson inspiring, instructive, and impressive.

The causes of the civil war are sinking out of memory, the passions aroused by it on both sides have died out, but the record of the valor, the patriotism and the endurance developed by it, will be perpetuated for generations.

History and patriotism "will do full justice to the courage, endurance and soldierly ability of the American citizen, no matter what

section of the country he hailed from or in what ranks he fought.”

We are now able to recognize Grant as one of the great soldiers of history, as we always did appreciate him as the most generous.

We unite with the soldiers of the Grand Army of the Potomac in paying our tribute of respect to the memory of McClellan the Chivalric and Hancock the Superb.

But our hearts turn to those so dear to us, and with uplifted faces we, with serene confidence, await the verdict of the coming generations.

A year ago I stood with you in that scene created by the zeal, the energy and the devotion of our women and embellished by their genius and their taste.

It was twenty years after the surrender at Appomattox, and yet the hearts of this whole people went out in sympathy for those who had suffered in that cause. As I looked at that brilliant scene it faded before me.

The dusky flag of Sumpter flapping on the wall, the battle-flag of Lee, of Johnston and of Beauregard, the golden spurs of Stuart—all became obscured by thickening shadows.

I see the beat of distant drums and the blare of coming bugles, and the air was astir with the noiseless tread of the coming host. I thought I saw the last march past in review of the Army of Northern Virginia.

Here on the right comes that swart figure, blackbearded, bestriding his white Arabian, with the grace of Saladin. It is Ashby leading the Knights of the Valley, sad and grave. He fell that June evening at dusk close by the Maryland colors.

Next rides the leader of the Cavaliers, Jeb Stuart, with his flowing plume, his golden spurs, his costume, as if he had just stepped out of the canvass of Vandyke. He fell at Yellow Tavern defending the guns of the Baltimore Light.

Next I see the lithe and active form of the most graceful man in the army—Hill, A. P., with his Light Division, as he rode forward that trying hour at Sharpsburg, coatless, with a rapier like a riding switch, the light of battle on his face. He died the morning the lines at Petersburg broke.

The ghostly column moves on, and here comes a Corps with quick step and light tread as if going to a dance. At its head rides Elzey the generous and open-hearted. After him comes Ridgely Brown, tender and true. Then William Murray, the mirror of gentle courtesy, passes on.

There is the Foot Cavalry.

Look at that swing that carried them over three armies in the Valley, round McClellan's flank on the Peninsula, to Pope's rear at Second Manassas.

At their front comes the silent figure with the weather-stained cap pulled down over his eyes, with the worn and faded coat, with the sunburnt beard, with the close-pressed lips, with the stern and fixed face. He bears the look he wore at Coal Harbor, when, with his right hand raised to Heaven, he prayed to the God of battles for that aid, which he believed would surely come to the pure in heart. He passed over the river at Chancellorsville.

Closing the column rides the Commander of the Army of Northern Virginia.

That grand figure, solemn, grave, bearing great responsibilities, has no peer save that of *Pater Patrie*. In fortitude, in courage, in genius, in fidelity, in patriotism, he fills as high a place as any hero of whom record has been made. He and his army, his achievements and his motives have passed in review before the Judge of nations and of hearts, of success and of defeat.

The Army of Northern Virginia has passed into history. "Its splendor remains, and splendor like this is something more than the mere outward adornment which graces the life of a nation. It is strength, strength other than that of mere riches and other than that of gross numbers—strength carried by proud descent from one generation to another—strength awaiting the trials that are to come."

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